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REGULARIZATION OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL AIR CHARTER SERVICES
ROBERT M. LICHTMAN*
Although non-scheduled air transportation plays an integral
part in international air transportation, charter services are subject
to diverse regulations and restrictions imposed by individual gov-
ernments. In this article Mr. Lichtman urges that the increasing
volume of non-scheduled air travel and its growing economic im-
portance necessitates the regularization of the legal status of inter-
national charter air transportation. The author suggests that a
balanced system be developed in which charter services, as well as
scheduled services, obtain secured status for continued development
through the use of bilateral agreements.
T HE DEVELOPMENT of large-scale international air charter
services and a separate class of charter-only airlines was doubt-
less unforeseen when the Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation was opened for signature on December 7, 1944.
While the Convention does touch the subject of non-scheduled air
transportation and includes a provision permitting traffic stops on
non-scheduled international revenue flights, subject to the right of
each state to prescribe "regulations, conditions or limitations as it
may consider desirable,"' a more important concern of the Conven-
tion was the inclusion of prohibition against scheduled international
air services over or into any state "except with the special permis-
sion or other authorization of the [s]tate . .. ."' This provision re-
quiring special permission from a state was "the legal expression of
* A.B., J.D., University of Chicago. Member of the District of Columbia and
Illinois Bars. This article was prepared for delivery at the First World Congress
on Air Transportation and Tourism held in Madrid, Spain in April 1972.
1 61 Stat. 1180. The Chicago Convention became effective on April 4, 1947.
'Id., Article 5(2).
I d., Article 6.
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the impasse reached by the Conference in its search for a multi-
lateral exchange of commercial rights in scheduled international
air transport."'
The preoccupation with scheduled services continued during the
early postwar years, when the attention of governments was focused
upon the exchange of scheduled air transport rights. Following the
Bermuda Conference in 1946, a widespread system of bilateral
agreements was developed regulating international scheduled ser-
vices. But, with very limited exceptions, no effort was made to secure
comparable governmental agreements covering non-scheduled air
services.' Non-scheduled services were simply governed by the "reg-
ulations, conditions or limitations" that individual nations elected
to impose. This disparity of constraints reflected the lack of im-
portance of non-scheduled traffic at that time.
In 1972, however, non-scheduled air transportation in the form
of charterflights "has come of age." Charter passengers now con-
stitute a significant portion of the traffic in numerous international
air markets; charter-only airlines carry a large percentage of this
traffic.' Charter services have become "a most valuable component
of the international air transportation system . . . ." Yet, for the
most part, charter air services remain subject to a hodgepodge of
unilaterally-imposed and widely-differing governmental regulations
and restrictions. For example, in a majority of cases, permission for
charter flights must be sought in advance on a flight-by-flight basis.
As a result, there is no secure legal foundation for the continued
existence and development of international charter services and
charter airlines; charters remain in constant jeopardy due to the
presence of hostile economic forces Because of the volume of
charter travel today, its widespread and growing acceptance by the
4 BIN CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 173 (1962) [here-
inafter BIN CHENG].
'The exceptions are the Paris Agreement and the United Kingdom, France/
Switzerland agreements. See text at notes 38-45 infra.
'See notes 27-28 infra.
Statement of International Air Transportation Policy of the United States,
approved by the President, 6 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 804
n.2 (1970).
1 E.g., INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, AN ANALYSIS ON INTER-
NATIONAL AIR CHARTERS UNDERTAKEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE EUROPEAN CIVIL
AVIATION CONFERENCE (1972); see also Letter of Transmittal from Knut Ham-
merskjold, Director General of IATA to Henrik Winberg, President of ECAC,
February 11, 1972.
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traveling public and the sizable economic and cultural benefits it
affords, the necessity for regularizing the legal status of international
charter air transportation is clear and urgent.
Subsequent to the preparation of this article, a vital first step
toward regularizing the status of international charter air service
was achieved with the signing on October 17, 1972 of a Memoran-
dum of Understanding between the United States and Belgium.
This agreement will govern passenger charter services between the
two countries during the three-year period beginning January 1,
1973. In view of its unprecedented character, the text of the Mem-
orandum of Understanding is set forth in an appendix and a post-
script section has been added to the article summarizing the princi-
pal features of the new agreement.9
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHARTER TRAFFIC
AND CHARTER AIRLINES
A. The Origins of Charter Air Services
Prior to World War II, charter flights were infrequent and eco-
nomically unimportant. In some cases the charter flights were per-
formed by scheduled airlines as a type of special service. As one
commentator recounts:
As soon as the regular airlines were established, they were called
upon to perform special services for which aircraft were particu-
larly suitable. The one classic service was the transportation of
great sums of money and gold, which governments during periods
of political crisis greatly needed. Other types of special flights were
rescue expeditions such as the search of the ABA aircraft 'Upplant,'
under charter to the Swedish Government, for the airship 'Italia'
lost in the Polar Region. The passenger group market was also
tried by several airlines. The Lufthansa sought traffic among the
passengers on the Norddeutscher Lloyd vessels approaching Ham-
burg and the Imperial Airways sought a similar clientele on board
the Cunard vessels approaching Cherbourg. Instances of affinity
groups chartering aircraft for travel to certain points are also re-
ported; thus a German yachting association ... in 1933 arranged
for its transportation to Copenhagen. The Zepplin airships in late
1929 settled for a policy of chartering the ship to sightseers taking
'See Appendix II. Certain modifications were made in the article to account
for intervening events.
19721
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as many as forty on the pleasure cruises over the Alps and even as
far away as Spitzbergen.10
In this regard, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938"1 provided for
the performance by scheduled airlines of "charter trips... or any
other special service."1
In other cases, fixed-base and other miscellaneous operators, who
utilized small aircraft, provided charter transportation among a
wide range of services. When the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
was enacted, these operators were deemed so inconsequential that
they were simply exempted from the licensing requirements of the
Act. The Civil Aeronautics Board later stated:
When the non-scheduled exemption order was adopted in 1938,
non-scheduled air transportation was of limited economic signifi-
cance. Although there were many such operators, most of them
were engaged in air transportation only to a limited degree, chiefly
as a byproduct of other air services-for example, the sale and
servicing of aircraft and accessories, aerial photography, flight in-
struction, aerial advertising, crop dusting, and the operation of air-
ports."
The chain of events set in motion by World War II, however,
greatly altered this state of affairs. A 1955 CAB decision sum-
marized the developments in the United States:
Conditions at the end of World War II, however, brought about a
rapid expansion in the activities of the irregular carriers. First, the
civilian demand for air travel increased tremendously after the war,
and the certificated carriers, whose activities were severely limited
during the war period, were faced with the problem of expanding
their operations to meet the growing demand for air service. Sec-
ond, a substantial number of veterans trained in the techniques of
aviation sought to enter the field of aviation as independent opera-
tors. Their entry into the field was facilitated by the availability of
surplus military aircraft, mostly C-46's and C-47's, which could
be leased or purchased at a relatively small cost. Equipped with
the larger aircraft, the irregulars sought to satisfy the enlarged de-
mand which the certificated carriers were unable to meet. The
traveling public readily accepted and patronized the rapidly ex-
1 C. SUNDBERG, Am CHARTER 11 (1961). (citations omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Sundberg].
11 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
"2Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 401(f).
"Investigation of Nonscheduled Air Services, 6 C.A.B. 1049, 1051 (1946).
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panding services of the irregulars to the point that they now consti-
tute an important segment of the air transportation industry."
Developments in Europe followed a similar pattern, as Sundberg
describes:
Already one year after the European Armistice there were about
thirty different French irregulars flying mainly between North
Africa, France and Great Britain. . . The traffic consisted to a
large extent of air freight, mainly emergency and high-cost goods
and perishable agricultural produce. Besides this, a great variety
of passenger traffic was taken care of, the carriers being able to
benefit from the natural desire of people to travel after the com-
pulsory isolation of the war. Much of the traffic was of a directly
military nature or, at least, owed its origin to military dispositions
as in the case of the flying of furlough personnel and dependents
of the members of the armies of occupation. Another traffic offered
in war-stricken Europe was the lift of emigrants to overseas desti-
nations. It was found by officials in charge of emigration affairs to
be more advantageous to fly certain categories of emigrants to their
destination than to send them by ship."
Although marked by growth in the early post-war years, the ranks
of the non-scheduled (irregular) carriers suffered substantial attri-
tion in the 1950's due to the rigors of competition and to regulatory
restraints. When, in 1948, the CAB closed the class of large irregu-
lar carriers to which it would grant exemption authority, 142
carriers had been issued such authority." By 1955, however, the
Board reported that only "some fifty irregular air carriers" were
then operating." In 1959, at the conclusion of a licensing proceed-
ing, it found twenty-six applicants qualified to receive authoriza-
tion as "supplemental" air carriers."
In Europe, a comparable diminution in the class of irregular
carriers apparently occurred, and, as in the United States, a few
of these carriers gained entry to the scheduled carrier class. '
14Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838, 858 (1955). See
Large Irregular Carriers, Exemptions, 11 C.A.B. 609-612-13 (1950).
"SUNDBERG at 25 (footnotes omitted).
18Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838, 891 (1955).
"Id. at 858.
"Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 224, 227 (1959). (The
number of United States supplementals today is far less-about nine).
"9SUNDBERG at 27-32.
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B. The Expansion of Charter Services in the 1960's
The 1960's marked the emergence of charter airlines in their
present form and the growth of sizable charter traffic across the
Atlantic and within Europe.
In the United States, the Congress in 1962 amended the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958" to establish supplementals as a permanent
class of air carrier authorized to perform "charter trips" in air
transportation. 1 Pursuant to the new legislation, the CAB conducted
extended licensing proceedings that resulted in the award of certifi-
cate authority to supplemental carriers in both domestic and inter-
national markets.2" In 1968, the Act was amended to authorize ex-
pressly the operation of "inclusive tour charter trips" (ITC's) by
supplemental airlines." The Congress stated that the supplementals
"have actively promoted the airline charter business to the point
where it is a growing means of travel for American citizens" and
that the "[s]upplementals are a permanent and integral part of the
national air transportation system .... .
In a parallel development, the CAB in 1963 granted for the first
time a foreign air carrier permit authorizing charter-only air serv-
ices." The recipient was Caledonian Airways, a United Kingdom
independent carrier. This was the forerunner of many of the char-
ter-only authorizations-now approximating thirty-five-issued to
airlines of the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, Germany, Den-
mark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Finland and others."
2 Public Law 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (1962).
2 1 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S 101(34), § 401(d)(3), 49 U.S.C. §
1301(34), § 1371(d)(3) (1970).
22 Transatlantic Charter Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 233 (1964); Supplemental
Air Service Proceeding, CAB Order E-23350 (March 14, 1966); Reopened Trans-
atlantic Charter Investigation, CAB Order E-24242 (September 30, 1966).
23 Public Law 90-514, 82 Stat. 867 (1968).
24S. REP. No. 1354, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1968).
2 Caledonian Airways (Prestwick) Ltd., 38 C.A.B. 501 (1963).
26 E.g., Laker Airways, Ltd., CAB Order 69-12-60 (December 15, 1969)
(United Kingdom); Wardair Canada Ltd., CAB Order E-26137 (December 19,
1967) (Canada); Spantax, S.A. CAB Order 70-1-138 (January 29, 1970) (Spain);
Condor Flugdienst, G.m.b.H., CAB Order E-26147 (December 21, 1967) (Ger-
many); Sterling Airways A/S, CAB Order 70-12-26 (December 7, 1970) (Den-
mark); Adria Airways, CAB Order E-22117 (May 3, 1965) (Yugoslavia); Mar-
tin's Luchvervoer Maatschappij N.V., CAB Order E-26146 (December 21, 1967)
(The Netherlands); Aero O/Y (Finnair), CAB Order 68-10-107 (October 21,
1968) (Finland).
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International charter traffic carried by both scheduled and charter
airlines experienced explosive growth throughout the 1960's. From
a modest base of less than 250,000 passengers in 1961, internation-
al passenger charter traffic to and from the United States by all
classes of carriers reached approximately 2.5 million passengers in
1970. The vast amount of this traffic-more than seventy-five per
cent-was carried in the transatlantic market. In 1961 transatlantic
charter passengers to and from the United States numbered 204,
000: approximately eleven per cent of the total United States trans-
atlantic traffic. By 1970 the charter figure had climbed to 1.91
million passengers, accounting for twenty-three per cent of all trans-
atlantic passengers to or from the United States. American and
foreign airlines, both charter and scheduled, have substantially
participated in this growing charter market. Of the 10,450 trans-
atlantic charter flights to and from the United States in 1970,
American supplementals performed 37.5 per cent, United States
route carriers 16.8 per cent, foreign route carriers 22.3 per cent,
and foreign charter carriers 23.4 per cent.2"
During much of the same period, intra-Europe charter traffic,
mostly in the form of single-stop inclusive tour charters, likewise
experienced dramatic growth. Revenue passenger-miles flown in
intra-Europe non-scheduled services increased nearly sixfold be-
tween 1963 and 1969. In 1967, twenty-four per cent of all pas-
senger-miles in the region were performed on non-scheduled ser-
vices. And 11.2 million passengers were transported on such ser-
vices in 1969. Of these passengers, nearly ninety per cent-almost
ten million-were carried on ITC's, as compared to an estimated
two million ITC passengers in 1963. The main flow of intra-Europe
charter traffic originates in northern Europe (principally, the United
Kingdom, West Germany and Scandinavia) and is destined for
points in the Mediterranean area. The extent of this traffic is such
that the number of United Kingdom residents who utilized ITC's
to the Mediterranean area in 1970 was equivalent to four per cent
of the total of the population of the United Kingdom. Approxi-
mately forty charter airlines (including a number of subsidiaries of
"'See CAB UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL AIR CHARTER PASSENGER MOVE-
MENTS, 1968-1970 (October 1971); Transatlantic Charter Investigation, supra,
40 C.A.B. 233, 294; IATA Reports; CAB THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SUPPLEMEN-
TAL AIR CkiRRIER OPERATIONS 28-29, 54-57 (September 1972).
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scheduled airlines) carrying the flags of thirteen European countries
participate in the intra-Europe charter market.'
The economic benefits to the destination countries of tourism of
this magnitude are, of course, very sizable. The United States De-
partment of Commerce has estimated that the average daily ex-
penditure, exclusive of transportation costs, of United States resi-
dents traveling in Europe in 1969-many of them transatlantic
passengers-was seventeen dollars; their average length of stay was
twenty-eight days."' While the expenditures of travelers on intra-
Europe ITC services are probably considerably less, the number of
these travelers is substantially greater. Spain, is the country of des-
tination for more than half of the intra-Europe ITC traffic," and is
perhaps the prime example of the economic rewards that charter
tourism can provide.
II. GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CHARTER AIR SERVICES
Notwithstanding the size and economic importance of inter-
national air charter traffic today, nations have hardly begun to agree
on a system of agreements among nations of the kind that has
served to provide protection and assured conditions of operation
for international scheduled services. While numerous bilateral agree-
ments are in effect covering scheduled air transportation, there are
virtually no bilateral agreements that are directed to charter services.
The Paris Agreement of 1956, the only multilateral agreement
aimed at regularizing the treatment of non-scheduled services, is
extremely limited in both scope and effect. As a consequence, in-
ternational charter flights are normally subject to unilaterally-im-
posed regulatory requirements that vary widely among countries.
For example, charters authorized under the laws of one nation are
often denied entry by other nations. Moreover, in many countries,
28 MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION, THE EUROPEAN CHARTER AIRLINES
(November 1970); Report of the Committee of Inquiry Into Civil Air Transport,
BRITISH AIR TRANSPORT IN THE SEVENTIES, 58-59 (May 1969) (hereinafter cited
as Edwards Report); Tourist Migrations and Population, ITA Bulletin No. 6, at
119-22 (Feb. 1972).
2 Forecast Charter Potential Under Updated Rules and an Inquiry into the
Matter of Impairment of Scheduled Services, Report to National Air Carrier As-
sociation, Appendix 28.
'* The European Charter Airlines; see note 28 supra at 16.
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written charter regulations are rudimentary and vest in administra-
tive officials discretion to decide on a flight-by-ftight basis whether
traffic rights for charters will be granted.
A. The Legacy of the Chicago Convention
This unsatisfactory state of affairs can in part be traced to the
Chicago Convention of 1944. The Convention provides in article
5 (2) that aircraft engaged in non-scheduled carriage of passengers,
cargo or mail for revenue shall "have the privilege of taking on or
discharging passengers, cargo, or mail subject to the right of any
[s]tate where such embarkation or discharge takes place to impose
such regulations, conditions or limitations as it may consider de-
sirable.""1 "As a result," Sundberg states, "governments felt that
they could regulate the entry of foreign air carriers almost at will."32
In 1952, the ICAO Council expressed the view that this provision
should not be "exercised in such a way as to render this important
form of air transport impossible or non-effective."'" Nonetheless,
Israel, a signatory to the Chicago Convention, bans all passenger
charter flights. Other countries have also imposed severe restrictions
upon charter services.
In addition to these severe restrictions, another source of difficulty
is the failure of the Chicago Convention to define "scheduled" and
"non-scheduled" services, and the subsequent inability of govern-
ments to arrive at a mutually satisfactory definition. In 1952, ICAO
attempted a definition of "scheduled international air service"-and
by exclusion a definition of "non-scheduled" service. This definition
stressed that scheduled services are "open to use by members of
the public" and that they are "so regular or frequent that they con-
stitute a recognizably systematic series."3 Since 1949, IATA traffic
conferences have wrestled with defining charter eligibility in a series
of versions of IATA Resolution 045.' And, beginning in the early
1950's, the Civil Aeronautics Board has been almost continuously
31 Under the first paragraph of Article 5, which deals with non-traffic stops
on non-scheduled flights, the Convention affords the "right" to make these stops
"without the necessity of obtaining prior permission.
'See note 10 supra at 75.
1 ICAO Doc. 7278-C/841, May 10, 1952, at 12, as quoted in BIN CHENG
at 197.
- ICAO Doc. 7278-C/841, May 10, 1952 at 3-6, as quoted in BIN CHENG
at 174-77.
1 See SUNDBERG at 102-08.
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engaged in revision of its charter rules." Illustrative of the prob-
lems of definition are inclusive tour charters, a recognized charter
mode, that are customarily open to the general public and conducted
on a regular basis. Accordingly, inclusive tour charters conflict with
the two major ICAO indexes of scheduled service. Moreover, the
affinity rules, which for years have been used to exclude the general
public from charter flights, are now widely (and accurately) criti-
cized as discriminatory."
B. Early Bilaterals and the Paris Agreement
The United Kingdom in the early 1950's entered into bilateral
agreements relating to non-scheduled air services with France and
Switzerland. The agreements with both countries dispensed with the
requirement of prior approval with respect to flights not performed
over scheduled air routes between the countries to the agreement,
and, in the case of flights over scheduled routes, air taxi operations
and "single flights"-i.e., flights performed by any given operator
less frequently than once in any thirty-day period (United Kingdom-
France) or ten-day period (United Kingdom-Switzerland). With
respect to charter flights not coming within these categories, the
United Kingdom-France agreement dispensed with prior permission
only in the case of single entity charters (i.e., for the charterer's
own use) on which no space was resold by the charterer, and the
United Kingdom-Switzerland agreement not at all.' These agree-
ments thus failed to remove the prior approval requirement either
for affinity charters or ITC's, which together constitute the vast
bulk of the charter market. Moreover, the agreements were short-
lived since the United Kingdom terminated them following its rati-
fication of the Paris Agreement of 1956."
The Paris Agreement"0 has been ratified by almost all of the
"' See Goldklang, Transatlantic Charter Policy-A Study in Airline Regula-
tion, 28 J. AIR L. & COM. 99 (1962); Benoff, Supplemental Air Carriers, 43
S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 797-808 (1970).
"See, e.g., CAB Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making (SPDR-22),
Docket 23055, January 29, 1971.
"1 BIN CHENG at 200-01. The latter agreement provided as to a series of char-
ters for a society or association (i.e., affinity-type charters) that prior permission
shall not be refused "without good reason." Id.
"BIN CHENG at 199, 206.
o Formally styled the Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights for Non-
Scheduled Services in Europe. See, generally, Weld, Some Notes on the Multi-
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European states. Only member states of the European Civil Aviation
Conference may become parties to it; the agreement is geographical-
ly limited to the metropolitan territories of the contracting states.4'
The preamble of the agreement states "the policy of each of the
[s]tates . . . that aircraft engaged in non-scheduled commercial
flights within Europe which do not harm their scheduled services
may be freely admitted to their territories for the purpose of taking
on or discharging traffic .... "'
Under the Paris Agreement, the contracting states agree to admit
specific types of non-scheduled revenue traffic "without the im-
position of the 'regulations, conditions and limitations' provided
for" in article 5(2) of the Chicago Convention.' The categories
of flights covered are humanitarian or emergency flights, air taxi
flights (not more than six passengers) of "occasional character,"
single entity charters on which no space is resold and single flights
(less than one flight per month between any given pair of points by
any operator or group of operators). In addition, all-cargo flights
and passenger flights between regions that "have no reasonably
direct connection by scheduled air services" are covered, provided
that any party to the Agreement may require the flights to be
abandoned "if it deems that [they] are harmful to the interests of
its scheduled air services operating in the territories to which this
Agreement applies.""
With respect to all other types of non-scheduled flights, which
means virtually all ITC's and affinity charters, the parties are free
to impose prior approval requirements, among other "regulations,
conditions, or limitations." ' In short, the Agreement does not affect
the vast majority of charter flights within Europe and is totally
inapplicable to charter flights serving points outside of Europe.
ECAC, which had its origin in the 1954 Strasbourg Conference
that led to the Paris Agreement, has adopted over a period of years
lateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services in Eu-
rope, 23 J. Ant L. & COM. 180 (1956).
4 Paris Agreement, Articles 1, 11.
4'See note 40 supra (emphasis added).
'Paris Agreement, Article 2.
"Id., Article 2(2).
"Id., Article 3 of the Agreement requires that parties adopt published regu-
lations, and also provides for short-notice applications for approval when not
more than four flights are involved.
1972]
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a number of recommendations or policy statements regarding
charter services. While ECAC policy has aimed at encouraging
charter services within Europe, ' it has been restrictive with respect
to transatlantic charters."7 Its recommendations have frequently
been followed by individual ECAC member countries; but they
have not been formalized in international agreements.
C. Unilateral Charter Policies of Today
With international charter traffic subject to unilaterally-imposed
"regulations, conditions, or limitations," a wide variety of regulatory
policies affecting charter services presently exists. These regulations
are sometimes permissive, but more often quite restrictive.
The United States grants unlimited on-route charter authority
to foreign route carriers under their foreign air carrier permits,
notwithstanding that all bilateral agreements between the United
States and other nations extend only to scheduled air services and
that, in some cases, no bilateral agreement exists."8 No requirement
of prior approval exists with respect to on-route charters. ' Foreign
route carriers, however, are required to obtain prior approval of
their off-route charter flights." In addition, foreign charter airlines
receive long-term permits that do not require prior approval of
individual flights.51 The permits of foreign charter airlines contain
an uplift-ratio restriction that requires that a substantial percentage
of the carrier's flights (approaching one-half as the volume of
4 E.g., Recommendation No. 6, Fourth Session of ECAC, Strasbourg (July
1961) concerning intra-Europe ITC's.
47 E.g., Recommendation Nos. 7, 8 and 9, Second Intermediate Session of
ECAC, Paris (July 1969) regarding "control" of transatlantic ITC's and affinity
charters.
"'See Japan Airlines, Foreign Air Carrier Permit, CAB Order E-24295 (Oc-
tober 14, 1966).
"'In a pending proceeding the CAB has proposed to condition the permits of
,foreign route carriers to enable it to require prior approval in specific cases when
the home country of the foreign carrier restricts the charter operations of United
States carriers. On-Route Charter Authority of Foreign Air Carrier Permits,
Docket 22362. See CAB Order 70-7-58 (July 13, 1970).
50 Part 212 of the CAB's Economic Regulations, 14 C.F.R. Part 212 (1970).
See Foreign Off-Route Charter Service Investigation, 27 C.A.B. 196 (1958).
" Each such permit, however, contains a condition that empowers the
CAB to invoke a prior approval requirement. In a recent order, the CAB
for the first time exercised this power against two United Kingdom charter air-
lines that it found had flouted its charter regulations. Donaldson Line (Air
Services) Ltd. and Laker Airways Ltd., CAB Order 72-3-67 (March 20, 1972).
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flights increases) must originate outside the United States." But,
the permits of foreign route carriers do not contain this restriction.
All foreign air carriers serving the United States are authorized
to perform affinity, single entity and most recently, travel group
charters, including split charters, under the same definitions or
terms as apply to American air carriers." And foreign charter
carriers (including several charter subsidiaries of foreign scheduled
airlines) are also authorized to perform ITC's upon the same terms
as American supplementals.'
The grant by the United States of broad charter authority to
foreign route and charter airlines under long-term permits without
any prior approval requirement has been premised solely upon con-
siderations of reciprocity and comity.5 But most of the foreign
countries have thus far failed to grant reciprocal treatment to
United States carriers. This conclusion is apparent from a recent
comprehensive review in a pending CAB proceeding of the regu-
lations and policies applied by foreign governments to charter flights
by United States scheduled and supplemental airlines." In this CAB
proceeding, the examiner found that most of the foreign countries
require prior approval of all charters by United States scheduled
and supplemental carriers before those charters can enter the
country. The examiner pointed out that the only exceptions to this
requirement are Ireland, Mexico and Switzerland, which do not
require prior approval for on-route charters of United States sched-
" See Caledonian Airways (Prestwick) Ltd., Foreign Permit, 38 C.A.B. 501,
504-05 (1963).
" See Regulation ER-659, adopted January 29, 1971, at 4-5.
"' Most foreign route carriers are precluded by IATA charter rules from per-
forming ITC's to or from the United States. In any event under existing CAB
regulations, no United States or foreign route carrier is authorized to perform
ITC's. The CAB, however, disapproved the TATA charter regulation (Resolution
045) in June 1972. CAB Order 72-6-91 (June 21, 1972). And there are pend-
ing CAB proceedings in which ITC authority is sought by IATA carriers. See
Petition of Trans World Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket 24727 (August 30, 1972),
Petition of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, CAB Docket 24780 (September 21,
1972). In addition, the recent United States-Belgium Memorandum of Under-
standing expressly provides for ITC operations by SABENA, the Belgian route
carrier. See ITC operations by SABENA in Appendix II.
'- See Japan Airlines, Foreign Air Carrier Permit, note 48 supra; Foreign
Off-Route Charter Service Investigation, note 50 supra; Caledonian Airways(Prestwick) Ltd., Foreign Permit, note 52 supra.
" On-Route Charter Authority of Foreign Air Carrier Permits, CAB Docket
22362.
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uled air carriers, and the Bahamas and Argentina, which do not
require advance approval of charter flights by American supple-
mentals5
The examiner further stated:
The actual practices of the foreign countries in applying the prior
approval requirements show wide variations. It appears that some
countries administer their regulations in a manner that imposes on
serious burden beyond the burden inherent in a requirement for
advance approval. Other countries, however, follow practices that,
whatever their objective, tend to inhibit and restrict the develop-
ment of charter services."
The examiner cited Portugal as an example of a country requir-
ing applications for summer charter flights to be submitted the
preceding December. Japan, on the other hand, will not accept a
charter application until five days before the flight is scheduled
and usually does not act on the charter application until immedi-
ately before the flight is to begin." The examiner also found:
"Countries sometimes vary their requirements on an ad hoc basis,
to deny permission for charters similar to those they had previously
allowed . . . ." In addition, "a significant number" of countries
"apply substantive limitations and restrictions of varying severity. ' '
These types of restrictions are not invariably based upon con-
siderations limited to charters. For example, the examiner found:
[C]ertain of the restrictions appear to have been imposed, not be-
cause of charter problems, but in an effort to obtain broader rights
for scheduled services in negotiations with the United States. Thus,
Belgium cited as the reason for its ban on supplemental carriers
from the East Coast area the breakdown in its negotiations with the
United States for scheduled rights for the Belgian carrier at Chi-
cago. There is also testimony that Japan is using its control of
charter landing rights as a tactic in its negotiation of rights for
scheduled service with the United States.
To be sure, there are many nations with liberal charter policies.
51 Recommended Decision of Examiner Greer M. Murphy, CAB Docket 22362
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Furthermore, those countries that have adopted more restrictive
policies have exercised a right granted them under the Chicago
Convention for reasons deemed valid by them and in their national
interest. In many cases, restrictions upon charters stem from a
sincere concern that large-scale charter services may injure the
scheduled flag carriers of the respective countries.
Charter travel, however, has become too important to consumers
of air transportation services, to tourist interests and to governments
to tolerate unilateral action by each nation often serving to frustrate
the transportation policies of other nations. If, as the Chairman of
the CAB recently stated, the growth of charter travel has made
possible a new "era of mass tourism" with "far-reaching benefits,
economic, cultural and educational," then nations must agree to
accommodate their differing charter policies to realize these benefits.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN REGULARIZING THE STATUS
OF INTERNATIONAL CHARTER SERVICES
There is growing recognition on both sides of the Atlantic that
unilateral regulation of charter services is inadequate; some form
of international understanding is needed. Even IATA, while adher-
ing to its traditional goal of restricting charter services, has recog-
nized this need. In a letter dated February 11, 1972, to the Presi-
dent of ECAC, the Director General of IATA states that a "multi-
lateral understanding on this crucial subject seems essential.""
ECAC is currently attempting to devise a formula for a multi-
lateral understanding concerning the regulation of charters."
The recent Statement of International Air Transportation Policy
sets forth the position of the United States." This Policy Statement,
the first United States policy statement on international air trans-
portation that has dealt with charters in depth, was prepared at
the direction of the President by a cabinet-level committee repre-
"Remarks by Secor D. Browne, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, before
the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, March 13, 1972, at 1.
"Letter from Knut Hammerskjold, Director General of IATA to Henrik
Winberg, President of ECAC, February 11, 1972 at 3.
"See Proposed Definition of and Conditions Applicable to a New Category
of Non-Scheduled Operations, presented by the ECAC delegation at the Second
Meeting on Transatlantic Charter Services, Paris, 21-22 March 1972 (TACS/2-
DP/3).
'See note 7 supra.
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senting all of the government agencies concerned with international
air transport; the Statement was approved by the President on June
22, 1970. Although the Policy Statement deals with all aspects of
international air transportation, a substantial portion of it is de-
voted to matters relating to charter services.
There are three aspects of the Policy Statement that should be
noted: (i) its emphasis on the need to preserve and encourage
charter services, (ii) its recognition of the existence of a "bulk
transportation market" in which both charters and scheduled ser-
vices should compete, and (iii) its recommendation that inter-
governmental agreements governing charter services be established.
Concerning the preservation and promotion of charter services,
the Statement is self-explanatory:
Charter services by scheduled and supplemental carriers have been
useful in holding down fare and rate levels and expanding pas-
senger and cargo markets. They offer opportunities to exploit the
inherent efficiency of planeload movement and the elasticity of
demand for international air transport. They can provide low-cost
transportation of a sort fitted to the needs of a significant portion of
the traveling public. Charter services are a most valuable com-
ponent of the international air transportation system, and they
should be encouraged. If it appears that there is likely to be a sub-
stantial impairment of charter services, it would be appropriate,
where necessary to avoid prejudice to the public interest, to take
steps to prevent such impairment."
On the subject of the "bulk transportation market," the State-
ment provides:
Both scheduled carriers and supplemental carriers should be per-
mitted a fair opportunity to compete in the bulk transportation
market. We consider passengers traveling at group rates on sched-
uled services to be part of that market. Regulatory and promotional
policies should give greater recognition to the dimensions, charac-
teristics and needs of the bulk transportation market, as such, and
less emphasis to the type of carrier that is serving that market.
However, the [g]overnment should not allow enjoyment of the right
6 See note 7 supra at 6. A parallel comment is made regarding scheduled
services. Id.: "Scheduled services are of vital importance to air transportation and
offer services to the public which are not provided by charter services .... Ac-
cordingly, in any instances where a substantial impairment of scheduled services
appears likely, it would be appropriate, where necessary to avoid prejudice to
the public interest, to take steps to prevent such impairment."
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to perform both scheduled service and charter service to result in
decisive competitive advantages for scheduled carriers."
The Statement's description of the "bulk" market in terms of the
character of the traffic, rather than the type of carrier that serves
it or the designation placed upon it, marks a healthy departure from
the preoccupation with labels and technical rules that had previous-
ly been a central feature of charter regulation. An analysis similar
to that of the Statement is found in the Edwards Report on British
air transport, which finds that in today's world the traditional defini-
tion of scheduled and non-scheduled services "makes little or no
sense."" The Edwards Report speaks instead of the " 'collective'
demand for continuously available service" that underlies scheduled
air transportation, and the "large areas of demand in which con-
tinuous availability is of little consequence and the primary concern
of the customer is to secure the cheapest possible price for a par-
ticular flight" that underlie charter transportation."0
The United States Policy Statement provides with respect to in-
ternational agreements to regulate charter services:
The foreign landing rights for charter services should be regular-
ized, as free as possible from substantial restriction. To accomplish
this, intergovernmental agreements covering the operation of
charter services should be vigorously sought, distinct, however,
from agreements covering scheduled services. In general, there
should be no trade-off as between scheduled service rights and
charter service rights. In negotiating charter agreements, the con-
tinuation of and the nature of the charter rights of foreign carriers
will be at issue. '
This recommendation has led to a determined effort by the United
States to secure international agreements covering charters.
It is puzzling to suggest, however, that agreements concerning
charter services be kept "distinct" from agreements relating to
scheduled services. In the long-run it may be impossible in practice
to separate the two types of agreements. In terms of the Policy
Statement, rigid compartmentalization of agreements covering
scheduled and charter services appears to conflict with the recom-
:8 See note 7 supra at 7.
"Edwards Report at 57.
I01d. at 58.
71 See note 7 supra at 8.
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mendation that both scheduled and charter airlines "should be
permitted a fair opportunity to compete in the bulk transportation
market"-a market that is said to include group fare traffic on
scheduled flights. If scheduled and charter "bulk transportation"
services constitute a single market, then all these services should
appropriately be governed by the same international agreements.
Unfortunately, bulk transportation services on scheduled flights are
in most cases covered by existing bilateral agreements, while the
charter portion of this market is not. In these circumstances, it is
preferable, in the short term, to proceed with intergovernmental
agreements limited to those charters as performed by all classes of
carriers, than to leave charter services subject to existing ad hoc
unilateral regulations, while a myriad of bilateral agreements cover-
ing scheduled services are sought to be amended.
Many of these same considerations apply to the broader question
of whether all air transportation services between any two nations
-i.e., bulk and individual scheduled services and charter services
-should be governed under the same agreement. All-inclusive
agreements are not only desirable, but well may be compelled by
practical considerations. While the United States may prefer to view
scheduled and charter services independently, other nations may
not. In some situations the only practical method of obtaining an
agreement on charters may be by an exchange of concessions in
the charter area for concessions relating to scheduled service. For
example, as noted in the examiner's findings quoted above,"2 at
least two countries have imposed restrictions on charter flights by
United States airlines as a negotiating tactic aimed at securing im-
proved route authority for their own scheduled flag carriers. Sim-
ilarly, a government with a highly restrictive policy toward charters
may have no real interest in entering into a charter agreement with
the United States-at least not the kind of charter agreement that
would carry out the objectives of the Policy Statement-unless it
could thereby obtain some concession that it wanted respecting
scheduled services. There is no reason why the United States should
refuse to make the desired concession simply as a matter of policy.
There is even less reason for the United States to refuse to discuss
this kind of exchange. Nevertheless, given the existence of outstand-
ing bilaterals covering scheduled services and the extreme difficul-
7 See note 57 supra at 18.
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ties involved in renegotiating those agreements to include charter
services, the short-run alternative is for the United States and other
governments to enter into agreements limited to charters unless the
basis for a broader agreement covering all air transportation ser-
vices is ascertainable.
Although the Policy Statement takes no position on the question
of whether "intergovernmental agreements covering the operation
of charter services" should be bilateral or multilateral in character,
the United States appears to be committed to the bilateral approach.
ECAC, on the other hand, seems to favor some form of multilateral
understanding.
The basis for the American position was explained by CAB
Chairman Secor D. Browne in his recent address before the Royal
Aeronautical Society in London. " His objections to the multilateral
approach were purely practical in character. After analyzing each
issue that would have to be dealt with in any agreement covering
charter services, he concluded that none of them is capable of
being handled multilaterally. Thus, he pointed out that "the matters
of number of carriers and access to varying markets is something
too closely identified by all governments with exchangeable benefits
to be derived," and therefore "cannot be lumped into a multilateral
understanding. 74 With respect to rate control, Chairman Browne
observed that any effort to tie charter rates to the IATA fare struc-
ture or some other uniform standard "would not necessarily meet
the interests of all the concerned carriers, all the concerned govern-
ments, or the concerned public; to fix rates multilaterally among
governments in some other way would present other substantial
difficulties, including the need for ponderous machinery.""3 He fur-
ther noted that "regulating charter capacity on a multilateral basis
would, with regard to any specific binational market, involve extra
governments without valid interests," that "government interests,
such as promoting tourism, vary from country to country," and that
"[m]arket characteristics differ among various pairs of points.""'
Moreover, the Chairman stated with respect to the question of pre-
venting impairment of essential scheduled services that "the level
" See note 63 supra.
74See note 63 supra at 10.
75 1d. at 11.
76 Id.
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of services between any pair of points is the concern of only two
governments" and therefore must be handled bilaterally." Lastly,
he noted that there are still wide differences among governments on
the question of charter definitions; any effort to achieve multilateral
agreement "would probably be at the cost of further delay in the
accomplishment of needed bilateral understandings and increased
tourism business."'
In light of past experience, the United States seems justified in
favoring charter bilateral rather than multilateral agreements.
Scheduled services are regulated bilaterally, and the effort that was
made in 1944 at Chicago to achieve a multilateral agreement on
scheduled services was unsuccessful. The Paris Agreement of 1956,
while multilateral, was reached at a time when charters were a less
sensitive issue and is extremely limited in scope."9 Thus, to suppose
that a comprehensive multilateral agreement could be reached on
charters, particularly since there are tremendous differences among
countries in the field of charter policy, would be unrealistic. Ad-
mittedly, the ECAC governments have occasionally been able to
reach substantial accord on certain charter policies; but as directed
to transatlantic charters, these have been in the past almost ex-
clusively restrictive in character." What the United States seeks to
achieve through international charter agreements, however, is not
more restrictions but the encouragement of charter services. This
goal will be difficult enough to achieve on a bilateral basis. It is
likely to be even more difficult to achieve-at least at the present
time-through any multilateral agreement.
IV. RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS FOR A CHARTER BILATERAL
Since the issuance of the United States Policy Statement, the
United States has commenced negotiations with several countries
to reach bilateral agreements governing charter air service." While
it is impossible to forecast the outcome of future negotiations, it
is useful to consider the type of agreement that would best serve
1i Id. at 12.
78 Id.
"See note 42 supra.
" An example is the minimum price restriction that ECAC governments have
imposed on transatlantic ITC's.
81 The negotiations with Belgium are the first to bear fruit, see text following
note 89 infra.
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the varied interests of consumers, airlines, suppliers of tourist ser-
vices and governments. Since it seems clear, for the reasons already
stated, that meaningful agreements can most readily be achieved
at the present time on a bilateral basis, this discussion will deal
with bilateral agreements.
The first objective of any bilateral agreement on charters should
be the elimination of any requirement for the advance approval of
flights. The agreement should permit charter flights to operate be-
tween the signatory countries under the same procedures as sched-
uled flights.
The designation of charter-only and scheduled carriers author-
ized to perform charter services under the bilaterals should be left
to the unilateral determination of each signatory government simi-
lar to the existing bilaterals governing scheduled service. The mat-
ter of carrier selection has traditionally been considered to be a
sovereign right of each nation; there is no reason why this principle
should not be equally applicable in the charter field. Of course,
the carriers of each country would be required to make formal
application for operating rights to the government of the other
country and would have to comply with all applicable laws of that
government relating to the operation and navigation of aircraft.
The most difficult issues to resolve are undoubtedly those dealing
with rate and capacity control, charter definition and the prevention
of impairment of essential scheduled services. It is in these areas
that the conflicting charter policies of different nations will have
to be reconciled. Those governments that have traditionally imposed
severe restrictions on charter transportation will seek to incorporate
those restrictions into any bilateral agreement, while those countries
with a liberal attitude toward charters will resist restrictions.
It is clear that the United States will not enter into any bilateral
agreement that is highly restrictive and aims at containment of
charter services. If the United States did so, it would violate the
principles of the Policy Statement. This does not mean, however,
that the United States is unconcerned about the preservation of
scheduled services. On the contrary, the Policy Statement empha-
sizes the "vital importance" of scheduled transportation and states
that steps should be taken, when appropriate, to prevent "sub-
stantial impairment" of scheduled services."
82 See note 7, supra at 6.
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Recognition of the need to protect scheduled services against
substantial impairment, however, is not the same as assuring their
profitability at the capacity levels the scheduled carriers choose to
operate. Only the essential level of scheduled service is entitled to
protection. The United States Department of Transportation, which
played a central role in drafting the Policy Statement, has adhered
to this view. In a recent submission to the CAB, the Department
stated the point unequivocally:"
[E]ven assuming some scheduled service is being impaired by
charter services, the question is whether that impairment is causing
'prejudice to the public interest.' . . . Where scheduled operators
operate capacity substantially greater than existing demand, it is
neither in their interest nor in the interest of the public to maintain
that condition, much less to protect it from charter operators. ' "
Similarly, the Edwards Report states that it may be necessary in
some cases "to distinguish between those scheduled services which
are essential and those which are desirable."85
Under this approach, provisions for capacity or rate controls
would be unnecessary and inappropriate." Certainly, there is no
reason to assume initially that restrictions of this kind are essential
in all situations to prevent impairment of vital scheduled services.
In the transatlantic market, for example, in which affinity charter
services have not been subject to capacity and rate controls, there
is no evidence that the rapid growth of these services over the past
decade has impaired vital scheduled services. On the contrary,
1 Comments of the Department of Transportation at 6, CAB Docket 23055
(Non-Affinity Charter Rule Making, May 6, 1971).
" To determine the essential level of scheduled service, the Department of
Transportation has suggested taking "the number of persons using scheduled
service at normal fares in an acceptable base year plus some proportion of the
number of downward diverted discount fare passengers," thereby ascertaining
the number who "have a vital need for the type of service that can only be pro-
vided by scheduled carriers." Significantly, using this method with 1968 trans-
atlantic traffic data for United States scheduled airlines, DOT determined that
those airlines were operating fifteen transatlantic round-trips per day above the
twenty-two round-trips found to constitute essential service. Id. at 9.
85Edwards Report at 59.
8 The term rate controls means minimum price restrictions aimed at protecting
scheduled services-such as the ECAC restriction on ITC prices-without regard
to the reasonableness of the rate when considered on its own merits. Wholly
apart from the impairment issue, a charter bilateral should appropriately con-
tain the usual kind of rate article requiring that the rates charged by each carrier
shall be reasonable.
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scheduled traffic has continued to grow at a very healthy rate dur-
ing the same period," and the capacity being offered, if anything,
substantially exceeds the level that can be deemed essential.8 An
individual traveler seeking scheduled service between points in this
market has a wide choice of convenient flights at all times of day
and in all seasons of the year. Admittedly, the market has become
increasingly competitive-but competition is not impairment nor
is it contrary to the public interest.
To be sure, it is possible to imagine situations in which rate or
capacity controls might be needed to prevent impairment of essen-
tial scheduled services. But these controls are clearly not needed in
all markets or in all circumstances. A bilateral agreement should
provide for ex post facto consultations in the event that one of the
signatory governments believes that restrictions on the charter rates
or charter capacity offered by carriers of the other country are
necessary to prevent impairment of essential scheduled services
provided by its own flag carriers. As is usual in bilaterals, the agree-
ment could also provide for arbitration in the event the parties
themselves could not resolve the issue. In short, capacity or rate
restrictions would be imposed only when it is demonstrated that
they are needed to avoid impairment of essential scheduled services,
and then only to the extent required to meet that specific need. This
format would be consistent with the United States Policy Statement
and with the view that absent other overriding considerations, low-
cost charter services should be encouraged.
The other major issue that would have to be resolved in a bi-
lateral agreement on charters would be the definition of charter
service itself. In view of the differing regulatory policies of various
countries, the two governments concerned may not be able to agree
on a single charter definition. In those situations neither party is
likely to agree that charter traffic originating in its homeland must
conform to the other party's concept of what constitutes charter
service.
An equitable solution to this problem would be to provide
generally that the agreement covers charter or group (but not in-
87In the 1962-71 period, United States flag carriers experienced a 17% an-
nual growth rate in their transatlantic scheduled traffic, and the annual rate of
growth of all IATA transatlantic scheduled traffic was 14%. (IATA Reports).
"See note 84 supra.
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dividually-ticketed) travel and further that each country's charter
definition will govern all flights originating in that country. This
approach would avoid the necessity of either side having to capitu-
late completely to the other party's charter definition; it would per-
mit each party to change or experiment with its charter rules during
the term of the agreement. Indeed, it is appropriate for each govern-
ment to determine how its own citizens will be permitted to travel,
and how the total air traffic originating in its own country will be
allocated among different classes of carriers or modes of carriage.
As in the case of capacity and rate controls, there is no basis
for assuming that this approach would lead to impairment of vital
scheduled services, especially since the charter definitions of all
countries are normally designed to protect against such impairment.
To guard against the possibility of impairment, however, the agree-
ment could provide that if it appeared that a party's charter defini-
tion was so broad that it resulted in substantial impairment of the
scheduled services provided by the other party's flag carriers, then
the other party could request consultations and arbitration.
The kind of bilateral agreement described above will not be
satisfactory to those who view all charter services as a threat to the
survival of the scheduled airline industry, and who believe that the
sole purpose of charter regulations should be to totally insulate the
scheduled carriers against that threat. But this view is rapidly de-
clining throughout the world. The old system of air travel, in which
scheduled services built around the needs of business travelers were
predominant, cannot meet the needs of this new age. What is needed
now is a balanced system of air transportation, in which both
scheduled and charter services must play an important role, and
in which charter services have an assured status by virtue of inter-
national agreements.
V. POSTSCRIPT-THE UNITED STATES-BELGIUM
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
The three-year Memorandum of Understanding between the
United States and Belgium, signed October 17, 1972, will for the
first time provide assured legal status for passenger charter services
between the United States and a foreign country. While this Memo-
randum of Understanding lacks much of the formal apparatus of
the usual bilateral agreement, and indeed states that "a bilateral
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non-scheduled air services agreement is not possible at this time,""
it is in many substantial respects the equivalent of a bilateral agree-
ment.
The Memorandum sets forth the two countries' "mutual ad-
herence to certain basic regulatory principles" and describes "the
regulatory regimes each will apply to operations of the other's
carriers over the foreseeable period extending from January 1, 1973
through December 31, 1975."" Among the "Mutually Recognized
Principles" are that "passenger charter air services provide . . .
important opportunities for promoting cultural exchange, tourism
and air commerce," and that the qualification of particular air
carriers and the operating conditions for charter services "should
be in conformity with the Chicago Convention, its pertinent an-
nexes, and equivalent to the treatment accorded to the parties'
designated scheduled carriers under Articles II, III, and VI" of the
United States-Belgium bilateral agreement.' The bilateral pro-
visions referred to deal with inauguration of air services, airport
and related charges, adherence to air navigation laws and regula-
tions and the requirement of substantial ownership and effective
control of air carriers by nationals of the contracting states."
Importantly, the Memorandum provides that passenger charter
operations "shall be permitted without advance approval of flights
subject only to reasonable notice requirements."" It also forbids
discrimination "among carriers of the other party," thereby ending
the discriminatory treatment that supplemental carriers have re-
ceived in the past.
With respect to the potential impact of charters upon scheduled
services, the Memorandum states that "[w]hile passenger charter
air traffic should not be permitted to cause substantial impairment
of scheduled air services, quota limits on the volume of passenger
charter air traffic are not acceptable for this purpose."" Nor is
89Memorandum to United States-Belgian Understanding on Civil Aviation
Charter Services, October 17, 1972, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. - (hereinafter
cited as Understanding) appearing as Appendix I supra.
90 Id.
9" Principles in Understanding.
"2 Articles of Agreement Between the United States and Belgium, signed at
Brussels, April 5, 1946.
93 Memorandum and Principles, par. 5 in Understanding.
94 Id., Principles, par. 3.
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there any provision for rate controls. Instead, "[t]he parties shall
deal with this question by establishing and enforcing reasonable
passenger charter regulations.... "Possible difficulties" arising from
charter operations under the agreement "will be discussed between
the parties in the shortest possible time.""
The two annexes to the Memorandum, which describe "the
regulatory regime" each party will apply during the three-year
term of the agreement, are intended to "provide a sound and secure
foundation for passenger charter air service for the foreseeable
future . . . .,. In the first annex, the United States agrees that it
will continue the on-route charter authority of the Belgian desig-
nated route carrier, SABENA, "for all charter types as are or may
be authorized to foreign scheduled airlines (including travel group
charters)" and treat the carrier's off-route charter operations as it
did prior to 1970, when the Belgian ban on East Coast-Belgium
charters by American supplementals was imposed.' SABENA will
also be authorized to perform inclusive tour charters-a form of
authority not presently held by any other United States or foreign
scheduled carrier.99 In addition, the United States agrees to continue
in force the foreign air carrier permit recently granted to Pomair,
a Belgian charter airline."®
In the second annex, Belgium agrees to permit "all United States
carriers certificated to provide passenger charter service to and
from Belgium . . . to pick up and set down in Belgium" charter
traffic between the two countries, including flights that serve in-
termediate countries or points beyond Belgium. ' This provision
covers "all charter type traffic as is or may be authorized by the
Civil Aeronautics Board (including travel group charters).'' ° In
SId.
Id., Principles, par. 4.
I d., Principles, par. 6.
99 Id., Annex 1, par. 1, 2.
9' Id., Annex 1, par. 4. See text at note 54 supra.
SId., Annex 1, par. 5. See Pomair, N.V., CAB Order 72-6-111 (June 27,
1972).
101 Id., Memorandum, Annex 2, par. 1. At present, five United States supple-
mental carriers (Capitol Airways, Overseas National Airways, Saturn Airways,
Trans International Airlines and World Airways) and one scheduled carrier (Pan
American World Airways) hold effective certificates authorizing United States-
Belgium passenger charter service.
11 Id. The reference to travel group charters is significant because this new
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addition, Belgium agrees that the American carriers will be allowed
to perform Fifth Freedom passenger charters between Belgium and
points in North America outside the United States (when author-
ized by authorities of the third country)."
In sum, the United States-Belgium agreement marks a break-
through in achieving the goal of the Statement of International Air
Transportation Policy of the United States that "foreign landing
rights for charter services should be regulatized, as free as possible
from substantial restriction.""'
form of charter has only recently been adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board(and, in slightly different form, by the United Kingdom) and is likely to expand
substantially the availability of charter services. See Regulation SPR-61, adopted
September 27, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 20808.
" Id., Annex 2, par. 2.
"o See note 7 supra at 8.
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APPENDIX II.
UNITED STATES-BELGIAN UNDERSTANDING ON CIVIL AVIATION
CHARTER SERVICES'
Representatives of the United States and Belgium today signed in Brussels a
Memorandum of Understanding on the regulation of passenger charter air serv-
ices. The Understanding stabilizes an environment which will permit United
States and Belgian airlines to conduct charter flights without arbitrary restraints,
including generally the need for prior approval, and sets forth the regulatory
regimes which each side will apply to charter operations of the other's airlines.
The Understanding is effective from January 1, 1973, through December 31,
1975. One effect of the Understanding is to restore to United States supplemental
airlines authority to operate charter flights between the northeast quadrant of
the United States and Belgium.
A copy of the Understanding follows.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Belgium have discussed the regulation of passenger charter air
services between their territories, and have concluded that a bilateral nonsched-
uled air services agreement governing such services is not possible at this time.
This memorandum sets forth mutual adherence to certain basic regulatory prin-
ciples which emerged from the discussion and describes the regulatory regimes
each will apply to operations of the other's carriers over the foreseeable period
extending from January 1, 1973 through December 31, 1975.
Mutually Recognized Principles
After a thorough review of their regulatory policies, the parties recognize
certain common elements important to both their governments.
1. Passenger charter air services provide the citizens of their countries im-
portant opportunities for promoting cultural exchange, tourism and air commerce.
2. The qualification of particular carriers to perform passenger charter air
services, and the operating conditions applicable to the operation, navigation,
servicing and handling of aircraft engaged in such services should be in con-
formity with the Chicago Convention, its pertinent annexes, and equivalent to
the treatment accorded to the parties' designated scheduled carriers under Arti-
cles II, III, V, and VI of the bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement between
Belgium and the United States, signed at Brussels April 5, 1946.
3. While passenger charter air traffic should not be permitted to cause sub-
stantial impairment of scheduled air services, quota limits on the volume of pas-
senger charter air traffic are not acceptable for this purpose. The parties shall
deal with this question by establishing and enforcing reasonable passenger charter
regulations.
4. Possible difficulties arising from the regulation, operation or volume of
passenger charter air service will be discussed between the parties in the shortest
possible time.
5. Unless otherwise specified in the annexes hereto, no discrimination should
be permitted against a carrier or among carriers of the other party performing
operations within the regulatory framework annexed to this memorandum and
such operations shall be permitted without advance approval of flights subject
only to reasonable notice requirements.
' The following is the Memorandum and Introduction as set forth in the State
Department News Release No. 264, dated October 17, 1972.
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6. To provide a sound and secure foundation for passenger charter air service
for the foreseeable future, there is set forth in the attached annexes the regula-
tory regime each party intends to apply from January 1, 1973 to December 31,
1975. Each party acknowledges its satisfaction with the policies of the other, and
confirms there will be no change in these regimes within the terms of the an-
nexes, unless otherwise understood between them.
Done at Brussels, October 17, 1972
For the United States of America: Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe
For Belgium: Minister of Communications and Transport, Fernand Delmotte
ANNEX 1
UNITED STATES REGULATORY POLICY
In the exercise of their regulatory functions, the United States civil aviation
authorities for the period extending from January 1, 1973 through December 31,
1975, will:
1. Continue the existing on-route charter authority of the Belgian designated
route carrier for all charter types as are or may be authorized to foreign sched-
uled airlines (including travel group charters).
2. Treat off-route charter operations of the Belgian designated route carrier
in a manner consistent with the treatment accorded them prior to 1970.
3. Authorize the Belgian designated route carrier to operate under paragraphs
1 and 2, Inclusive Tour charters authorized by Civil Aeronautics Board rules.
4. Authorize the Belgian designated route carrier to lease a Belgian registered
aircraft with crew from another Belgian certificated carrier for operations under
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 in accordance with existing Civil Aeronautics Board rules
and procedures.
5. Continue in force the other charter foreign air carrier permit currently held
by a Belgian carrier.
6. Accord liberal treatment under existing procedures to applications of other




In the exercise of their regulatory functions, the Belgian civil aviation au-
thorities, for the period extending from January 1, 1973 through December 31,
1975, will:
1. Permit all United States carriers certificated to provide passenger charter
service to and from Belgium to exercise the right to pick up and set down in
Belgium such passenger charter traffic moving between a point or points in the
United States and a point or points in Belgium (one way or roundtrip, nonstop
or via intermediate countries, as well as to or from points beyond or behind)
for all charter type traffic as is or may be authorized by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (including travel group charters).*
2. Continue to permit the same operations by the same carriers as in para-
graph 1 above when the traffic is moving in either direction between Belgium
and a point or points in North America outside the United States and such
charter flights are authorized by the competent authorities of the third country.
3. Grant liberal treatment to applications of other Civil Aeronautics Board
authorized United States carriers for limited and infrequent charter flights to
and/or from Belgium.
* Where authority to uplift a particular Belgium-originating charter flight
composed of third-country residents has been denied by another European au-
thority, the Belgian authorities reserve the right to require prior approval.

